Rooftop Snipers and Political Assassinations: A Clear and Present Danger
First things first—we grieve for the family and friends of Charlie Kirk and Turning Point USA. Civil discourse should never be met with violence of any kind. Now, a clear-eyed look at what happened—and what it means for rooftop threats, aerial overwatch, and keeping public events safe without dimming the public square.
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It’s time for a serious conversation about an unsettling threat: the emergence of rooftop snipers targeting political figures. In the past year, two high-profile incidents – an assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump and the sniper killing of conservative speaker Charlie Kirk – have made it alarmingly clear that this danger is real and immediate. These attacks, carried out from elevated perches at open-air events, underscore a new level of risk for public officials and prominent figures. In a deeply polarized climate already marred by rising political violence, protecting our leaders and citizens from such threats has become an urgent priority¹. This article takes a measured, respectful look at what happened in these incidents, why rooftop sniper attacks pose unique security challenges, and how security professionals and policymakers can respond – including the critical role of drone technology in future safeguards.
Recent Attacks Highlight the Threat from Above
The Trump Rally Shooting (Butler, PA, July 2024): During a campaign rally at a fairground near Butler, Pennsylvania, former President Donald Trump narrowly survived an assassination attempt by a rooftop sniper². On July 13, 2024, a gunman armed with an AR-15–style rifle climbed onto the roof of a nearby building and opened fire on the crowd and the stage². Trump was struck by a bullet fragment that grazed his right ear, injuring him and drawing blood, though he ultimately recovered². In the chaos, 20-year-old Thomas Matthew Crooks, the shooter, fired eight rounds from his elevated position, tragically killing one attendee – a local firefighter named Corey Comperatore – and critically wounding two others³⁴⁵. Secret Service agents and police reacted within seconds: a local officer on a nearby roof initially confronted the gunman moments before the shooting, forcing the attacker to briefly halt⁵⁶. Seconds later, as shots rang out, Secret Service counter-snipers returned fire and fatally shot the gunman to prevent further carnage²⁵. The image of Secret Service agents rushing Trump off the stage, with blood on his face and determined defiance in his raised fist, became an iconic reminder of how close the nation came to a tragedy². Officials later described this as the most serious security failure for a protectee since the 1981 attempt on President Reagan – a stark wake-up call that even a former President under Secret Service protection could be minutes away from assassination in today’s charged environment⁷.
The Charlie Kirk Assassination (Orem, UT, September 2025): Just over a year later, on September 10, 2025, conservative speaker and Turning Point USA co-founder Charlie Kirk was shot and killed by a sniper during a campus event at Utah Valley University⁸⁹¹⁰. Kirk was speaking under an outdoor tent to a crowd of students when a single rifle round pierced his neck, mortally wounding him⁸⁹. Investigators determined the bullet was fired from the roof of a campus building a significant distance away, where the assailant had positioned himself unseen; video released by authorities shows the suspect jumping down from the rooftop and fleeing immediately after the shot¹⁰. He was later identified and arrested; prosecutors have since filed first-degree murder charges⁸⁹. The aftermath at the UVU campus was chilling – the tented stage cordoned off with police tape as investigators combed the area. Campus security for the event was relatively light – only six officers and private guards were present, with no metal detectors or bag checks – which made it easier for the shooter to find a vantage point without detection¹¹¹²¹³.
These two incidents, occurring a little over a year apart, lay bare a clear and present danger: determined attackers are willing to turn high vantage points into killing grounds to strike at public figures. Notably, both shootings followed a pattern reminiscent of infamous historical assassinations – a sniper’s perch, an unsuspecting crowd, and a few terrifying seconds that change everything. In the Trump rally case, only luck and split-second heroism prevented a former U.S. President from being killed in front of his supporters²⁵. In Kirk’s case, the attacker succeeded in murdering his target before anyone even realized where the shot came from⁸⁹¹⁰. These are not isolated events. In fact, analysts note they are part of a broader surge in political violence in recent years; the first half of 2025 alone saw roughly 150 politically motivated attacks – nearly double the number from the same period a year before¹. Attempted assassinations on major figures (including two attempts on Trump in 2024 – Butler in July and a thwarted attempt near his Florida golf course in September) have created an environment of palpable anxiety¹⁴¹⁵¹⁶. The use of a rooftop sniper tactic in particular represents a deadly convergence of meticulous planning and exploitable security gaps. It demands that we confront hard questions: How can we better secure open-air events and rally sites? What tools and protocols are needed to counter sniper-style attacks? And how do we adapt without undermining the openness of democratic discourse?
The Unique Security Challenge of Rooftop Snipers
Protecting public figures at events has always been a daunting task, but the rooftop sniper scenario introduces new complexities. By attacking from an elevated, distant position, a shooter can evade typical close-range security measures like metal detectors, pat-downs, or on-site police presence. This high-ground advantage gives an assailant a wide field of vision and makes it harder for security teams to pinpoint the threat quickly amid a panicked crowd. As seen in the Butler rally shooting, even a robust security operation with multiple layers can have a blind spot. In that case, the venue had an outer perimeter patrolled by state police and an inner ring of Secret Service agents, including counter-sniper teams positioned around the site; despite these precautions, the shooter exploited a critical oversight: a nearby building with a sloped roof that was not occupied by security personnel³⁶⁷. Secret Service leadership later explained that agents had deemed the roof unsafe to station a sniper on (due to its pitch) and thought securing the building’s interior was sufficient, a decision that left the rooftop accessible³⁶. In hindsight, experts questioned why alternative measures (like aerial surveillance) weren’t used to monitor such a potential high-ground threat⁷. Why was a rooftop with a clear line of sight to the stage left unguarded? – that is the kind of tough question being asked in the aftermath³.
Open-air venues like fairgrounds, college campuses, or city plazas are especially difficult to secure 360-degrees and 24/7. There are often many surrounding buildings, hills, or other elevated structures that could serve as hiding spots. Checking and securing each one before an event (and keeping them secure throughout) is a labor-intensive challenge, often involving coordination with local law enforcement and use of specialized teams. In the Trump rally, the Secret Service did sweep adjacent structures ahead of time, but the dynamics of the location changed – one building’s roof that was deemed inaccessible to security turned out to be accessible to the attacker³⁷. Similarly, on the UVU campus where Charlie Kirk was killed, the event took place in a relatively open environment with multi-story campus buildings around. Only six police officers and Kirk’s private security were on duty for a crowd of roughly 3,000¹¹¹²¹³, and no fencing or magnetometers were screening the area¹²¹³. Under those conditions, a determined shooter could mingle at a distance or enter a nearby building without drawing attention. Indeed, video and investigative updates show the suspect climbed to a rooftop minutes before the shot and leapt down to flee afterward¹⁰. By the time anyone understood what had happened, the shooter was gone and chaos had erupted.
Another aspect of this threat is how little warning it can afford. Unlike a typical active shooter scenario where the presence of a firearm might be noticed by magnetometers or vigilant attendees, a sniper can set up covertly at a distance. In Butler, some alert rallygoers did spot a person climbing a roof and shouted warnings; a local officer raced to that roof and encountered the gunman moments beforehand, only to have the assailant point the rifle at him, forcing the officer to retreat and call for backup⁵⁶. This incredibly close call highlights that even when there are a few seconds of advance notice, it may not be enough to stop a determined sniper unless the security team already has eyes on that position. In Utah, there was essentially zero warning – the shot rang out during Q&A, and Kirk collapsed before anyone heard or saw anything unusual besides the crack of the rifle⁸⁹. By operating from a concealed or elevated spot, a sniper can initiate an attack with maximum surprise and potentially escape in the confusion. All of this means that traditional security protocols need to be rethought when it comes to outdoor events. Covering a stage with agents and scanning the crowd at ground level, while still necessary, is no longer sufficient by itself if a threat can originate hundreds of feet away above eye level.
Rethinking Event Security: Snipers, Drones, and New Measures
In light of these dangers, security professionals are calling for a multi-pronged upgrade to how we secure political events – from better on-the-ground tactics to high-tech surveillance. One immediate lesson from the Butler rally shooting was the value of counter-sniper teams – and their limitations. The Secret Service had deployed counter-snipers for Trump’s event (for the first time in his post-presidency campaign) and, by many accounts, their swift response saved lives⁶. Officials confirmed that going forward, every major rally for top candidates will have Secret Service sniper coverage, not just relying on local SWAT, as a standard practice⁶. However, countersnipers can’t be everywhere at once – they need line of sight, and they need to know where to look. That is where technology is stepping in as a force multiplier.
Perhaps the biggest change in thinking has been about drone technology and aerial surveillance. After the Trump rally attack, it emerged that local police had offered the Secret Service the use of a surveillance drone to monitor the venue from above – an offer that the Secret Service declined at the time⁶. In hindsight, this was seen as a missed opportunity. “We should have had a better line of sight on some of those high ground concerns,” acknowledged Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe Jr., noting that agents had “thought we might have it covered with the human eye” but clearly needed to leverage technology more⁶. Moving forward, Rowe stated, the agency is working to add drones and other unmanned aerial surveillance to its security protocols so that potential sniper nests or suspicious movements on rooftops can be detected in real time⁶. In fact, House Speaker Mike Johnson argued that using drones over large events should be standard practice now⁷. Modern drone cameras can scan crowds and rooftops far more broadly and quickly than a person on the ground with binoculars, potentially spotting a threat like a person lurking on a roof with a weapon. The Federal Aviation Administration confirmed that the Secret Service had not requested the special waivers needed to fly drones over the Butler rally (which is why none were deployed)⁷. That is now changing; security teams are being urged to incorporate live-feed drones for overhead eyes at any high-risk gathering.
It’s worth noting that technology cuts both ways. Alarmingly, investigators revealed that the Butler rally shooter himself used a small commercial drone for reconnaissance in the days before the attack⁷. In other words, the perpetrator scouted the venue and sightlines from above, likely to plan his shooting position, without detection. This is a wake-up call that security teams not only need to use drones, but also need defenses against them. Counter-drone technology – systems that can detect, jam, or intercept rogue drones – is still in its infancy in many civilian settings. Current U.S. regulations severely limit who can deploy counter-drone measures, generally reserving that authority for the Department of Defense and a few federal agencies during special national security events⁷. In a perfect world, an effective counter-drone system at the Butler rally might have noticed an unauthorized drone flight over the fairgrounds and alerted security to investigate the operator⁷. That could have led them to Crooks before he ever pulled the trigger. Moving forward, policymakers may need to relax or adapt laws so that the Secret Service, Capitol Police, and other protective agencies can utilize counter-UAV tools at major political events. Just as important, event organizers should coordinate closely with local law enforcement’s drone units. Had the Secret Service accepted the local police drone assistance in Butler, an eye in the sky might have caught a glint of the shooter’s rifle or his movement on the roof in time to sound an alarm. That kind of close cooperation – leveraging all available resources – is critical.
Beyond drones, more conventional security upgrades are also being implemented. After the near-miss in Pennsylvania, lawmakers and security officials called for immediate physical improvements to rally setups⁷. The Secret Service quickly approved the use of bulletproof glass shields around stages at outdoor campaign events for major candidates⁷. This measure, reminiscent of the “Popemobile” concept or the protective barriers used during presidential inaugural speeches, can provide a frontline defense: even if a sniper manages to fire a shot, a well-placed pane of ballistic glass can stop a bullet before it reaches the candidate or speaker. Indeed, when Trump returned to the campaign trail shortly after the assassination attempt, his team had him speak behind bullet-resistant glass at subsequent outdoor rallies⁷. Of course, this isn’t foolproof (such glass usually covers frontal arcs, not all angles, and it doesn’t protect the audience), and it can create a sense of distance between speakers and crowds. But as a temporary emergency measure it adds a layer of protection that could be life-saving, and it signals to would-be attackers that the target is not as exposed as before.
Event planners are also revisiting venue selection and preparation. Holding rallies in wide-open fairgrounds or campuses with tall buildings nearby is now recognized as inherently riskier. Wherever possible, sites with natural or pre-existing security advantages (for instance, stadiums or airports with controlled perimeters, or locations without adjacent high-rises) are preferable. If an open venue must be used, advance teams should conduct detailed surveys of the surrounding area: every rooftop, parking garage, hill, or window with a view of the stage should be mapped and assessed. In some cases, that might mean stationing officers or agents in those overlooking positions (or, if that’s not feasible, ensuring those doors/roofs are locked and alarmed). The Butler incident revealed that even when a structure is outside the official security perimeter, it can’t be ignored if it poses a line-of-sight threat to the event³⁷. From now on, high-ground containment has to be a top priority in security planning. This could involve something as simple as posting a spotter with binoculars on an opposing building, or as elaborate as deploying new radar-based systems that detect the flash or sound signature of gunfire and automatically pinpoint its origin. There’s also discussion of using acoustic gunshot detection technology around major event venues – these systems can triangulate the source of a gunshot within seconds, potentially guiding protective details to the sniper’s location faster. Every second counts, and the sooner the source of gunfire is identified, the quicker security can respond or evacuate the protectee.
Taking Drone Security Seriously – A New Frontier
A recurring theme in these discussions is the pivotal role of drone security – both using drones to our advantage and defending against malicious drone use. Drones provide agility and vantage that ground teams simply cannot match. A single high-flying drone equipped with a zoom camera can patrol a radius around an event and peer down onto rooftops, treetops, and other potential hideouts. This is why experts insist that for any large outdoor political gathering, aerial surveillance by drones (or helicopters, where available) should become as routine as metal detectors at the gate⁷. It’s not science fiction or overkill; it’s a necessary adaptation to the modern threat environment. The cost of deploying a drone unit is trivial compared to the cost of a security disaster. And as the technology improves, drones can even be outfitted with thermal imaging to spot hidden individuals or sensor packages to detect weapons.
At the same time, hostile use of drones is a growing concern. We’ve already seen drones used overseas in assassination attempts and warfare – from drone bombings to reconnaissance on battlefields. The fact that a would-be assassin in Pennsylvania used a hobby drone to case a rally site⁷ should remove any doubt that this tactic can and will be copied by others. Security agencies are starting to treat drones as the new potential “rooftops.” A drone hovering above an event could be there to film or to attack; either way, if it’s not authorized, it’s a problem. Thus, “drone security” means countermeasures like radio-frequency scanners to detect drone control signals, jamming equipment to disable or divert drones, or even trained birds and drone-catching nets in some experimental cases. Policymakers need to ensure that legal frameworks allow security teams to deploy these counter-drone tools quickly when needed. The goal is to deter and disrupt threats before shots are fired – whether that threat is a person on a roof or a drone in the sky.
Balancing Security and Openness
As we push for stronger protective measures, it’s important to strike a balance. Political rallies, campus speeches, and public events are the lifeblood of a democratic society – they are meant to be open, energetic, and accessible. The idea of fortress-like protections, drones buzzing overhead, and snipers on every roof is unsettling in its own right. Security professionals and policy makers must work together to implement smart solutions that enhance safety without unduly chilling public participation. This means transparently communicating why certain measures (like drones or visible counter-sniper teams) are being used – to prevent panic or misinterpretation – and tailoring security to the threat level of each event. A small-town hall might not need the same level of overwatch as a 10,000-person rally for a presidential candidate. Risk assessments, driven by intelligence, should guide the allocation of resources. In high-risk scenarios, attendees might see more officers on rooftops or notice a drone overhead, and that should be normalized as the new reality for VIP events, not as an intimidation factor but as a reassurance that safety is being guarded.
Leaders from both major parties have voiced support for heightened security in the wake of these incidents⁷. There is also a recognition that heated political rhetoric can contribute to violence, and a call for everyone – officials, media, and citizens – to tone down inflammatory language. President Joe Biden, responding to the Trump rally shooting, emphasized that political differences must be resolved peacefully and that “there is no place in America for this kind of violence”⁷. This sentiment is crucial: improving security is one side of the coin, preventing the fury and hatred that feed such attacks is the other. A serious conversation about rooftop snipers thus inevitably broadens into a conversation about the state of our political climate. The protective measures discussed here are reactive by nature – they respond to a threat that has manifested. Equally important is being proactive in reducing the likelihood that anyone becomes so radicalized or enraged as to carry out these heinous acts.
Conclusion: Confronting the Danger, Protecting Democracy
Between the near-assassination of a former U.S. President and the murder of a young political activist, we have been jolted into acknowledging a sobering fact: the threat of political violence from above is no longer hypothetical. It is here, and it demands action. Security professionals must adapt to this threat with vigilance and ingenuity, employing every tool from sharpshooters to drones, while policymakers must support them with the necessary authorities and funding. The goal is straightforward – to ensure that open political discourse does not become a shooting gallery, and that our public figures (and their audiences) can gather without fear of sudden attack.
This will require investment in training and equipment, yes, but also a cultural shift to take these threats seriously. No more dismissing unusual reports of someone on a roof, no more hesitancy to deploy a drone because it’s unconventional – we have to use all eyes and ears to detect danger early. It will also require continued cooperation between federal agencies like the Secret Service and local law enforcement, who often know the venues and communities best. The Butler rally incident showed both the pitfalls of miscommunication and the heroism of local responders; integrating those lessons can save lives going forward⁶.
Above all, we must remember that protecting our leaders and maintaining free, peaceful political expression go hand in hand. When violence enters the fray, democracy itself is under attack. By having this serious conversation and confronting the reality of rooftop snipers and modern assassination attempts, we are taking the first step toward countering the threat. The clear and present danger is now evident – and so is our resolve to meet it. In the words of one shaken attendee after the Utah shooting, “We’re on the front lines where it’s not always safe.”¹ Staying one step ahead is the price of safeguarding democracy – and it’s a price we must be willing to pay.
Sources
Rising political violence trends and 2025 first-half incident counts.
https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2025/september/political-violence-risks/Timeline of the July 13, 2024 Butler, PA rally shooting and immediate aftermath.
https://apnews.com/article/trump-assassination-attempt-timeline-59e2f4fcdf8379aa2cb5f141825d60a3Identification of victim Corey Comperatore; casualty details.
https://apnews.com/article/trump-rally-victim-fire-chief-11e1aa65e6e45584f49577686d38766eAdditional victim/hospitalization updates from the Butler rally.
https://apnews.com/live/election-biden-trump-campaign-updates-07-13-2024Eyewitness accounts, rooftop warnings, officer encounter, and Secret Service counter-sniper response.
https://apnews.com/article/trump-assassination-attempt-what-happened-734900d303fcfbf349162047f8059601
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/lack-communication-drone-issues-plagued-secret-service-trump/story?id=113872172Post-incident changes: countersniper posture, integration of drones; why no drones at Butler.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/secret-service-bolsters-security-drones-mobile-command-posts-after-butler-assassination-attempt-trump/
https://www.newsweek.com/secret-service-drones-trump-rally-questions-1926868Why the sloped roof was unsecured; FAA waiver posture; adoption of bullet-resistant glass; attacker’s pre-event drone reconnaissance.
https://www.congress.gov/118/meeting/house/117528/documents/HHRG-118-GO00-20240722-SD046.pdf
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/08/15/secret-service-trump-rallies-bulletproof-glass/
https://apnews.com/article/trump-assassination-attempt-drone-fbi-733811e02b1e609de6a9bc35f6b8c141Initial reports and visual timeline of the Sept. 10, 2025 Utah Valley University shooting that killed Charlie Kirk.
https://abcnews.go.com/US/visual-timeline-charlie-kirk-shooting-unfolded/story?id=125478526Law-enforcement updates confirming rooftop sniper fire and charging developments.
https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/utah-valley-shooting-updatesReleased video showing the suspect jumping from the rooftop and fleeing.
https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/utah-valley-shooting-video-091025.mp4/viewComparative event-security reporting (e.g., six officers; ~3,000 attendees at UVU).
https://apnews.com/article/0a68ac679546f88076b53323421591f5Reporting on lack of magnetometers/bag checks and venue vulnerabilities at UVU.
https://abcnews.go.com/US/fatal-shooting-charlie-kirk-puts-utah-valley-universitys/story?id=125474742Crowd size and on-site staffing details; screening posture at UVU.
https://www.deseret.com/utah/2025/09/10/charlie-kirk-shooting-utah-valley-university-campus-security-police/Second 2024 attempt on Trump (Florida golf club) — DOJ indictment and case details.
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/ryan-wesley-routh-indicted-attempted-assassination-former-president-trumpIndependent review/after-action analysis of Secret Service performance and reforms post-Butler.
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/24_1017_opa-Independent-Review-Panel-Final-Report-and-Accompanying-Materials.pdfAnalytical coverage tying both incidents to the broader escalation in U.S. political violence.
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/nation-edge-experts-warn-vicious-spiral-political-violence-after-kirk-killing-2025-09-11/